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In conflict-affected situations, aid-funded livelihood interventions are often tasked with a dual 
imperative: to generate material welfare benefits and to contribute to peacebuilding outcomes. 
There may be some logic to such a transformative agenda, but does the reality square with the 
rhetoric? Through a review of the effectiveness of a range of livelihood promotion interven-
tions—from job creation to microfinance—this paper finds that high quality empirical evidence 
is hard to come by in conflict-affected situations. Many evaluations appear to conflate outputs 
with impacts and numerous studies fail to include adequate information on their methodologies 
and datasets, making it difficult to appraise the reliability of their conclusions. Given the primary 
purpose of this literature—to provide policy guidance on effective ways to promote livelihoods—
this silence is particularly concerning. As such, there is a strong case to be made for a restrained 
and nuanced handling of such interventions in conflict-affected settings.
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Introduction
Livelihood security and inclusive growth are generally seen to be good for develop-
ment and peace. By extension, so too are interventions that seek to promote livelihoods 
and stimulate economic activity. The UN Secretary General’s 2006 progress report 
on the prevention of armed conflict, for example, drew linkages between effective 
livelihoods and food security interventions and increased stability, arguing that 
‘tackling food insecurity and related problems of agricultural underproduction and 
resource scarcity can do much to stabilize a fragile situation’ (Alinovi et al., 2007, 
p. 5). More recently, the 2011 World Development Report (World Bank, 2011) 
placed significant emphasis on the instrumental role that job creation is seen to play 
in creating safer societies in the aftermath of war.
 Following conflict, therefore, livelihood and economic recovery interventions are 
often tasked, implicitly at least, with a dual imperative: to generate material welfare 
benefits (for example, through supporting livelihoods and stimulating local economic 
activity) and to contribute to peacebuilding outcomes (for example, through raising 
the opportunity cost of going to war and minimising grievances). This framing may be 
compelling and appear deductively sound, but catalysing livelihood change and alter-
ing market dynamics are complex, highly ambitious objectives for any intervention—
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particularly so in the challenging environments of (post-)conflict spaces. In contexts 
where it is difficult to achieve success against even basic outcome indicators (for 
example, nutritional status, school attendance) (Torres and Anderson, 2004), the 
question must surely then be asked: does ascribing livelihoods programming with 
ambitious transformative objectives, such as promoting stability, represent the kind 
of ‘premature load bearing’ discussed by Pritchett et al. (2012)? Is it often, in fact, 
the case that donors and governments are pushing ‘too hard, too soon’, and thus 
risking failure?
 With these questions in mind, the contribution of this paper is to explore the 
effectiveness of a range of interventions designed to promote the livelihoods of people 
living in fragile and conflict-affected situations, and to reflect on the nature and qual-
ity of the impact evidence base. Through a survey of the impact literature on five 
interventions, our intention is to provide a useful synthesis of relevant studies and 
evidence to examine whether claims of the ‘transformative potential’ of program-
ming are backed up by strong empirical evidence, and to contribute more broadly to 
evidence-informed policy making in this area.
 The paper is structured as follows. In the following section, we provide some 
basic information on methodology and our conceptual framing of livelihood inter-
ventions. We then explore the synthesised empirical evidence on a programme-by-
programme basis. Interventions covered include (in order): microfinance; value chain 
development; ‘making markets work for the poor’ (M4P); job creation programmes; 
and skills training. In the following section, we broaden out the analysis and ask: 
how far does the evidence base actually take us? We make six key points about the 
nature of the literature in order to inform the way researchers and decision makers 
handle evidence in the future. Finally, we conclude with some brief remarks and 
observations.
Methodology
This paper is based on a longer working paper, produced during the inception year 
of the Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium (Mallett and Slater, 2012).1 The 
purpose of the working paper was to synthesise available empirical evidence on 
economic growth and livelihoods in fragile and conflict-affected situations, with a 
view to taking stock of the evidence base, identifying key themes and findings, and 
highlighting knowledge gaps. The methodological approach (detailed in Mallett and 
Slater, 2012, pp. 100–106) involved three iterative stages: i) a three-track evidence 
gathering exercise; ii) an ongoing process of synthesis and analysis; and iii) the 
inclusion of insights from leading experts in livelihoods and growth in reference to 
fragile and conflict-affected situations. 
 Of particular relevance here is the approach to evidence gathering. As mentioned, 
this involved three mechanisms. First, researchers undertook a series of systematic 
reviews into the impacts of selected interventions in fragile and conflict-affected 
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situations, including M4P, which is reported on below (for more information on the 
use of systematic reviews in international development see Hagen-Zanker et al., 2012; 
White and Waddington, 2012).2 Second, researchers used a snowballing approach 
to identify relevant material, starting with a list of studies determined by recognised 
experts working on livelihoods and economic growth (again, in reference to fragile 
and conflict-affected situations). Third, in addition to the above, a more orthodox 
literature review was undertaken, involving the use of academic databases, institu-
tional websites and internet searches.
 A number of key themes emerged from the subsequent analysis, one of which was 
the effectiveness of aid programming in conflict-affected situations. Evidence within 
this thematic area is concerned principally with the practical mechanics of promoting 
economic activity and supporting livelihoods both during and (particularly) after 
conflict. Much of the evidence comes from donor reports and is used to inform ‘lessons 
learned’ documents and policy guidance notes. 
 While some of the evidence concentrates on broad policy measures, such as invest-
ment climate reforms and public financial management, our focus here is on livelihood 
promotion interventions targeted primarily at the micro level (that is, individual, 
household, community). Livelihood promotion is one of three types of livelihood 
intervention, the other two being livelihood provision and livelihood protection 
( Jaspars and Maxwell, 2009). These three types of intervention differ primarily in 
terms of their main objective(s) (Table 1), although it is recognised that interventions 
are often tasked with multiple objectives at the same time. Livelihood promotion 
interventions, broadly speaking, aim to go beyond immediate needs by creating new 
assets, improving the economic productivity of beneficiaries, and improving people’s 
access to markets and services ( Jaspars and Maxwell, 2009, p. 9). It is this type of 
intervention that tends to be mandated with the most ambitious objectives, which is 
why livelihood promotion interventions constitute the focus of this paper.
 Before moving on to the main section of this paper, it must be emphasised that the 
original reviews on which it draws were conducted in 2011/12. An evidence base is 
Table 1. Examples of livelihood interventions, by category
Type of intervention Livelihood provision Livelihood protection Livelihood promotion
Objective(s) Directly affecting outcomes 
through meeting basic 
needs and contributing to 
personal safety
Protecting assets and pre-
venting negative outcomes
Improving strategies,  
creating assets, enhancing 
access to markets and  
supporting appropriate 
institutions and policies
Examples (as covered in 
Mallett and Slater, 2012)
•	Food	aid
•	Cash
•	Public	works	programmes
•	Infrastructure	projects
•	Seeds-and-tools
•	Seed	vouchers	and	fairs
•	Livestock	interventions
•	Microfinance
•	Value	chain	development
•	M4P
•	Job	creation
•	Training
Source: authors, drawing on Jaspars and Maxwell (2009).
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not a static or monolithic thing, but is always on the move. While the lag time between 
carrying out the reviews and the publication of this paper does not discredit the 
analysis presented here, readers must be aware that the most recent contributions to 
the literature are not captured.
Do we know how to promote livelihoods in conflict? 
Evidence from a menu of five interventions
Aid-funded livelihoods programming during and after conflict has attracted a sub-
stantial literature. Much of this literature seeks to answer the question: what kinds 
of interventions should we be looking to implement in order to improve people’s 
livelihoods in these difficult contexts? As a result, one does not have to look too far 
to find a mass of papers offering policy recommendations and programme guidance. 
From the perspective of the ‘development community’, as it were, the existence of 
this wealth of information is unsurprising: such papers are often written with the express 
aim of informing policy makers and practitioners. Their purpose is to guide and 
advise—which is perfectly understandable.
 Drawing on a survey of the literature, this section lays out in brief but illustrative 
terms what the evidence base for five livelihoods interventions tells us about their 
effectiveness in conflict-affected contexts. For various reasons, it is not possible to delve 
into the specifics of programming, which is unfortunate: there is an important place 
for nuanced discussions of individual programmes. Nor is it our intention to provide 
direct, actionable guidance of our own making to those in the policy and practi-
tioner communities. This is not a ‘how to’ piece, to be used to determine what should 
be implemented when and where. Rather, by drawing on illustrative examples, our 
aim is to sketch out an overview of what the literature tells us about the impacts of 
the five interventions under consideration—an overview that will be necessarily 
problematised in the following section. We begin with microfinance, before moving 
on, respectively, to value chain development (VCD), ‘making markets work for the 
poor’ (M4P) programmes, job creation programmes and training. 
Microfinance
Microfinance is among the most widely discussed of livelihood interventions in 
fragile and conflict-affected situations. Drawing on empirical work from Matul and 
Tsilikounas (2004) and Santos (2003), the German Technical Cooperation (GTZ, 
2006, p. 20, emphasis in original) claims that ‘microfinance can serve as perhaps one 
of the most efficient instruments to support household incomes, self-employment and 
micro-enterprise formation during post-conflict reconstruction periods’. Frasier 
and Bne Saad (2003, p. 7) additionally suggest that microfinance has the potential to 
facilitate ‘a smooth transition from short-term humanitarian assistance to longer-
term development’. 
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 However, our survey of the literature suggests that claims such as these are thinly 
evidenced. It may well be that microfinance is simply assumed to work, almost regard-
less of context—although this is increasingly being shown not to be the case (see 
Duvendack et al., 2011)—which would also help explain why the vast majority of 
the substantial literature on microfinance and conflict focuses on the technicalities 
of programme design and implementation rather than on impact. Indeed, a range of 
lessons, often derived from donors’ own experiences, are available to practitioners 
wishing to deliver a microfinance intervention in a conflict-affected environment (see, 
for example, ESCWA, 2009; Nagarajan, 1999; USAID, 2009). But the empirical 
basis for such lessons is not always clear. Discussions of methodology and data are 
often limited to a brief statement assuring the reader that the agency in question 
has previous microfinance experience in conflict settings, and it is also sometimes 
unclear whether the evidence and lessons presented are particular to conflict-affected 
situations or drawn from a broader experience of delivery in more stable contexts. 
Indeed, we often simply do not know what the empirical basis for claims and conclu-
sions consists of. 
 Nonetheless, microfinance and microcredit programmes have been supported and 
implemented quite extensively in fragile and conflict-affected situations, both by 
governments (see IMF, 2006; Longley et al., 2006) and by non-governmental organi-
sations and donors. Generally speaking, evidence of the impacts of such interven-
tions, assessed through programme evaluations, appears mixed. For example, an evalu-
ation of an American Refugee Committee programme in Guinea found significant 
increases in capital assets among clients progressing from start-up grants to basic 
and advanced loans (de Klerk and Nourse, 2004).3 But when compared, the average 
size of capital assets owned by those who received a grant or loan did not differ 
significantly from those of the control group. Therefore, although it would have been 
difficult (if not impossible) for the more vulnerable among the refugees to develop 
their businesses without the grants and loans, there is no solid empirical evidence 
that the growth in asset portfolios was a result of access to microcredit through the 
programme (de Klerk and Nourse, 2004). 
 On a different note, van de Walle (2002) shows how certain credit schemes—
such as one in Yemen where poor households were given 10 goats or five goats and 
a cow, taught to raise them and then expected to pay back 60 per cent of their 
value within two years—can carry significant risks for families who must pay back 
loans even if the animals die, leading to negative impacts on income. An alterna-
tive to such traditional microcredit interventions can be seen in PACT’s Women’s 
Empowerment Program in Nepal, which enabled 86,000 women to start a business 
over four years through the mobilisation of a total of USD 1.18 million in group 
savings. This demonstrated that, even in a country in the midst of conflict and pov-
erty, women can build equity (rather than debt) to facilitate livelihood promotion 
activities (Ashe and Parrott, 2001; see also Upreti et al., 2012, for a discussion of 
this intervention). 
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 It is the government of Afghanistan that has arguably gone furthest of all in terms 
of taking a leadership role in the microfinance sector in its country, with the estab-
lishment of the Microfinance Investment Support Facility for Afghanistan (MISFA) 
in 2003. A number of studies and assessments of MISFA have been carried out over 
recent years, the findings of which effectively illustrate the mixed nature of the 
evidence on microfinance in fragile and conflict-affected situations more broadly. 
We examine these studies in Box 1 below. 
Value chain development
The fundamental objective of value chain development (VCD) is ‘to move poor 
individuals and households out of saturated, low-return activities and into higher-
return, growing markets’ (Parker, 2008, p. 1). It involves ‘linking poor producers 
Box 1. Competing findings: the case of the Microfinance Investment Support  
Facility for Afghanistan (MISFA)
In a major quantitative evaluation covering 79 per cent of the client population in nine provinces of five Afghan 
regions, Greeley and Chaturvedi (2007) found early signs that MISFA was having a major impact in terms of job 
creation. Expansions and start-ups were providing job opportunities for 414 entrepreneurs and allowing 264 
clients to employ other people, from both within and outside the household, either full or part time. They esti-
mated that every client generated one and a half employment opportunities, which, when extrapolated to all 
MISFA clients, gives a total of 500,000 jobs. MISFA also showed signs of success at the household level, with 
the rate of incidence of crisis situations lowest among clients and a statistically significant difference in the rate 
of incidence between clients, non-clients and dropouts. The evaluation also highlights positive findings in rela-
tion to gendered power relations and perceptions, with 44.1 per cent of women clients reporting ‘absolute 
control’ over the money they earned as opposed to 18.4 per cent of non-clients and 37.2 per cent of dropouts, 
and 80 per cent of female respondents reporting an ‘improved attitude’ towards themselves on the part of their 
husbands and other relatives since they joined the programme.
Despite the positive outcomes reported by this earlier evaluation, however, the effectiveness of MISFA can be 
questioned on a number of counts. Pain (2012), drawing largely on the primary research of Kantor (2009), covers 
some of these. First, objectives matter: the needs of clients, not the objectives of policy makers, ultimately deter-
mine the use of microcredit. Microcredit through MISFA has emphasised the provision of credit for productive 
purposes in order to stimulate economic activity and growth. However, evidence from rural areas points to its 
significant use to meet consumption smoothing requirements rather than productive investment. Thus, develop-
ment of financial instruments to create social insurance has been limited and secondary to efforts to drive market-
based engagement for the poor. 
Second, context matters. There is a broader issue about the general lack of interest and understanding of how 
new, formal rules, organisational structures or programmes engage with existing social structures and informal 
institutions. Demand for microcredit exists in Afghanistan, but so does a vibrant informal credit system. MISFA 
microcredit thus constitutes just one option among many, and may not even be the best. Indeed, Kantor shows 
that people often draw from multiple microcredit systems, sometimes using informal credit to pay off MISFA 
loans, suggesting a build-up of informal debt. More generally, microcredit and informal credit markets are linked 
to such an extent that the success of the former may ultimately depend on clients’ access to the latter in order to 
support repayment of the microcredit loan. 
Third, measurement matters. Indicators can be selected to support the public text of success without necessarily 
questioning or exploring what might underlie this. Early reporting on MISFA focused on the number of microfinance 
loans dispersed, the number of groups established and levels of repayment, without critically assessing how 
these loans were repaid and the economic benefits that might have accrued from them. In other words, the focus 
was placed on measuring outputs, which, while useful for gauging the internal effectiveness of MISFA (that is, 
how successful the project was in meeting its coverage), provided little insight into beneficiary outcomes.
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to other private-sector actors who have access to growing markets and who have a 
clear business interest in partnering with poorer producers as part of their supply 
system’ (Parker, 2008, p. 1). The available evidence on VCD in conflict-affected 
situations is broadly similar in nature to that on microfinance: dominated by tech-
nical guidance. Indeed, there is a rich literature on practical lessons from value chain 
projects in conflict-affected situations. Of particular note are papers from USAID’s 
Value Chain Development in Conflict-affected Environments Project, which include 
case studies on, among others, the cotton industry in northern Uganda, tourism in 
Rwanda, fisheries in Sri Lanka, the poultry sub-sector in Afghanistan and the dairy 
industry in Kosovo.4 Parker (2008) synthesises these case studies, covering a total of 
14 value chains in conflict-affected environments. Amongst other findings, the author 
concludes that VCD projects can generate significant economic results in terms of 
sales, employment and private sector investment (see Grygiel, 2007, on Kosovo; 
Henning et al., 2008, on Rwanda), and can be used to reach vulnerable populations, 
even amidst conflict (see Locke and Byrne, 2008, on northern Uganda; McMahon, 
2008, on Afghanistan). While these are surely important lessons, the specific method-
ologies underpinning their recommendation are, once again, unclear. Furthermore, 
reports in this particular USAID series on VCD sometimes conflate output with impact.
 ‘Making markets work for the poor’ (M4P) programmes
M4P projects are systemic attempts to understand where market systems are failing 
to serve the needs of the poor and to correct them accordingly. They are a relatively 
novel approach to economic engagement in conflict-affected (most notably post-
conflict) situations.5 
 As explained in the previous section, as part of the research process for our review, 
we undertook a systematic review of the impacts of M4P projects in fragile and 
conflict-affected situations. Out of 483 studies originally retrieved, just three were 
found to meet the criteria for final inclusion. It is therefore difficult to make state-
ments about the effectiveness of M4P programmes based on this particular systematic 
review. While the three studies suggest that M4P can lead to increases in incomes 
and social cohesion amongst beneficiaries (via an accumulation of trust within 
economic networks), overall the key finding was that there is currently insufficient 
evidence on the applicability and impact of the M4P approach in situations of sig-
nificant conflict and fragility (see Carpenter et al., forthcoming). Undoubtedly, further 
research is needed to test whether the impacts identified above can also be achieved 
using the M4P approach in such situations; for example, can they more generally 
facilitate increased social cohesion in these settings? This is an interesting question, 
particularly given the success of USAID in funding business projects in Kosovo 
that have helped bring together Serb and Albanian groups in the production and 
marketing of food commodities (UNDP, 2008). Another particularly pertinent ques-
tion in these situations is whether, if grounded in comprehensive political economy 
and conflict analysis, they can effectively help facilitate the (re)inclusion of vulner-
able groups, particularly women, cut off from markets as a result of conflict.
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Job creation programmes
Given that employment creation programmes seek to create both jobs that transfer 
income to poor people and durable assets that have lasting value (Devereux and 
Solomon, 2006), they can be considered a livelihood promotion intervention. The 
literature on job creation relates mainly to efforts to create waged employment in the 
formal sector, and tends to be associated with short-term public works projects and 
short-run/emergency job creation (for example, food and cash for work), usually 
funded and implemented by the public sector. Again, the evidence on job creation 
tends to be provided by practical donor guidance and assessments of effectiveness, 
rather than on academic literature, which is relatively limited. 
 A look at the policy discourse around the need for jobs in conflict-affected settings 
makes it clear that a number of assumptions are frequently made about the violent 
causality of certain groups (usually young men) being unemployed. As Sommers (2006) 
observes, this line of thinking is closely connected to ideas about the youth bulge, 
which became politically influential among Western foreign policy communities from 
the 1990s onwards. Indeed, several writers have made similar points to Sommers (2006, 
p. 3), when he argues that ‘the youth bulge theory implies that young men with 
constricted options will automatically and necessarily respond with violent rebellion’.
 However, there is a worrying lack of convincing evidence contained within the 
literature on job creation programmes to support such assumptions. In a background 
paper for the 2011 World Development Report, Cramer (2010) notes that the empiri-
cal data on the relationship between unemployment and violence, in general, are 
simply not there: 
There is no remotely convincing evidence at the cross-country, large-N level, at the quan-
titative case study level, or at the ethnographic, ‘qualitative’ level, for any bold claims that 
unemployment is a mechanistic causal factor in violent conflicts in developing countries. 
The evidence on youth unemployment is even weaker (Cramer, 2010, p. 24).
 Two recent reviews of the evidence on employment programmes in conflict-
affected situations appear to back up Cramer’s conclusion. The first is a rapid map-
ping study by Walton (2010), which reviews donor approaches to addressing armed 
violence through youth job creation programmes. The central finding is that, although 
such approaches have become more nuanced and sophisticated—attempting to address 
a range of factors that cause social exclusion by combining with other forms of 
intervention, such as training in conflict resolution—both the ‘theoretical and the 
empirical cases for using youth employment programmes as a stand-alone tool for 
reducing violent conflict are extremely weak’ (Walton, 2010, p. 1). Walton (2010) 
identifies the main gap in the current literature as: 
a lack of critical analysis of the impact and broader social, economic and political effects of 
youth job creation programmes [. . .] This gap is closely related to a failure to thoroughly 
articulate and examine the mechanisms via which job creation programmes impact upon 
local or national-level conflict (Walton, 2010, pp. 10–11).
Richard Mallett and Rachel Slater 234 
 The second is a recent systematic review into the impact of employment creation 
on stability and poverty reduction in fragile and conflict-affected situations (Holmes 
et al., 2013). This identifies just seven relevant studies, the majority of which either 
present anecdotal evidence or are based on secondary literature reviews. Further, 
the authors state that the policy literature ‘in this area is primarily intuitive [. . .] and 
based on the assumption that if unemployment contributes to instability, then employ-
ment creation will promote stability’ (Holmes et al., 2013, p. v)—an assumption, it 
seems, that the empirical evidence does not substantiate. The central finding of these 
two reviews is fairly damning: we simply do not know what the impacts of job crea-
tion programmes are. 
Skills training
Training is an example of an intervention intended to promote greater ‘employability’ 
of individuals. By aiming to contribute to an improved supply of suitable labour, it 
serves as a complement to other types of intervention designed to increase the demand 
for labour. In addition, training is often promoted in fragile and conflict-affected 
situations, particularly in post-conflict situations, as a means of getting people into 
jobs, especially in terms of reintegrating youth and ex-combatants and rebuilding 
livelihoods.6 
 The literature contains evidence from a number of vocational training programmes, 
which shows there is often a mismatch between training and jobs. This evidence 
suggests that a failure to connect training to current and future demand on behalf 
of employers leads to a failure to meet the high expectations of ex-combatant partici-
pants (McKibben, 2011; UNDP, 2008). To select from an abundance of examples, 
only a quarter of the ex-militia forces trained in the New Beginnings Programme in 
Afghanistan secured long-term employment, with one ex-combatant noting that 
the programme ‘promises things [but] no one gives us a job [and] we are all so 
disappointed’ (Bhatia and Muggah, in McKibben, 2011, p. 19). Similarly, only 13 per 
cent of ex-combatants surveyed in Colombia who underwent a vocational training 
programme were subsequently employed (Arjona and Kalyvas, in McKibben, 2011). 
 Furthermore, across the programmes reviewed by McKibben (2011), there was 
a general failure to attend to psychological problems, and training for women ex-
combatants, when conducted at all, was intended to support reintegration into domes-
tic life but not the workplace. Failure to address mental health problems is especially 
significant in northern Uganda, given that 25 per cent of producers and traders 
there said they would not employ someone with mental health problems, yet 25 per 
cent of male youth experience moderate to high levels of emotional distress, and 
ex-combatants are 50 per cent more likely to experience emotional distress than 
those not previously involved in the conflict (McKibben, 2011). In addition, Grossman 
et al. (2009) argue that formal skills development courses are often inappropriate in 
many contexts, as they are usually based within a structured, officially approved system 
where entrance is regulated and which provides access to an officially recognised 
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qualification. This kind of training lacks relevance in many conflict-affected contexts, 
where formal sector employment is usually difficult to find. Further, the costs of 
these kinds of formal training courses are high (on a per capita basis), thereby lim-
iting their reach. Instead, the authors recommend the provision of training courses, 
which have a lower educational entrance requirement and which are flexibly organ-
ised to meet the needs of the trainees. 
 However, not all training programmes in fragile and conflict-affected situations 
have been unsuccessful. For example, in northern Iraq, the Food and Agricultural 
Organization (FAO) and the UN Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) 
implemented technical and business management training that led to 61.3 per cent 
of beneficiaries who were unemployed before training gaining employment or self-
employment by the time of the evaluation (UNIDO and FAO, 2010). Another 
important dimension of this project was that it enhanced capabilities in the Minis-
tries of Industry and Agriculture, thus potentially contributing to increased project 
sustainability and institutional strengthening. Meanwhile, in Aceh, a GTZ vocational 
training programme achieved a major impact by controlling for the factors that often 
contribute to the vocational training–jobs mismatch (see McKibben, 2011).
How far does this take us? Reflections on the fragile state 
of the impact evidence base
The evidence cited above under each programme heading may not capture all that 
is out there, but it does tell us some important things about the nature of the evidence 
base more generally. We centre this section on one overarching question: how far 
does the evidence (on programme effectiveness in fragile states) take us? We attempt 
to answer this through a critical engagement with the literature, drawing on our own 
review work as well as the critical contributions of others. The aim is to highlight 
key issues or concerns in order to inform the way researchers and decision makers 
handle evidence in the future. In a sense, the following six points can be considered 
‘things to watch out for’ when navigating one’s way around a given evidence base.
1. Policy guidance is often based on minimal evidence
There have been important recent moves to improve the quality of evidence on the 
effectiveness of development and humanitarian programmes. We have seen the 
emergence and growth of important organisations tasked with generating and pro-
moting the use of rigorous impact evidence, such as 3ie and the Active Learning 
Network for Accountability and Performance (ALNAP), as well as evidence- and 
methods-focused conferences such as the Big Push Forward programme.7 However, 
this does not remove the flaws affecting much of the literature published already. 
Our review of the evidence (at the time) was striking in that so many reports cited 
minimal empirical evidence to back up claims and recommendations—recommen-
dations that were principally tasked with informing decision makers. Most of the 
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time, it was not the case that weak or questionable evidence was drawn on. Rather—
and, arguably, more worryingly—data sources were simply not visible at all. The 
central question this raises is: how can an audience trust the findings? In short, the 
recommendations featured in many papers might be well-grounded, valid pieces of 
advice, but without reliable information on their foundations, they are essentially 
unusable from an evidence-informed policy perspective.
 In addition, there are some questions regarding the trustworthiness of many reviews 
of the literature (that is, sources of secondary research). Such reviews are often intended 
to distil vast bodies of information into a series of key messages and findings. It is 
only relatively recently that an explicit focus on the quality of evidence has entered 
the modus operandi of many literature reviews in international development. This is 
partly a consequence of a stronger emphasis being placed on empirical information 
by those funding review research.8 However, a cursory reading of many synthesis 
reports based on secondary research methods reveals a tendency to take the findings 
of primary research studies for granted. In effect, findings are regurgitated unprob-
lematically and free of critical perspective. In the worst cases, it is possible to find 
literature reviews uncritically repeating the findings of previous literature reviews. 
Against this backdrop, the recent emphasis on method type and evidence quality 
within mainstream discussions on development policy and programming is welcome, 
if not at times problematic (see footnote 8). 
2. There is a focus in the literature on the technicalities of programme 
design rather than the socio-political realities of implementation
The way in which many documents with an explicit policy focus have been written 
is very prescriptive. They set out to tell people how to get the details of programme 
design right, based on an analysis of how well or badly things have worked in the 
past. There is often an assumption here that what has worked in one place can also 
work in another, despite the mounting evidence advising extreme caution vis-à-vis 
results transfer and extrapolation (Pritchett and Sandefur, 2013). 
 There are perhaps three main points to make about the predominance of techni-
cal discussions in the literature. The first is that important place-specific factors tend 
to be treated as secondary. It is quite common for authors to argue that ‘context 
matters’ but go little further. Designing and implementing livelihoods interventions 
in places affected by conflict is particularly difficult for a reason. For one, the intro-
duction of new forms of physical and financial capital into settings that have recently 
seen violent conflict may, in some cases, contribute to the development of war econ-
omies. In such places, understanding what created conflicts and crises in the first place 
must be part of efforts to plan an appropriate response (Collinson, 2003).
 Second, all aid interventions shape the social, economic and political dynamics 
of local areas (the ‘implementation sites’), but these will differ from one interven-
tion to the next. There are multiple factors (some known, some unknown) that shape 
what kinds of outcomes occur, but programme design is certainly one thing that 
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plays a role. There is evidence, for example, that greater visibility of aid transfers 
may increase levels of violence in beneficiary areas through the (unintended) crea-
tion of high profile targets (Crost et al., 2014). Thus, we return to the point just made: 
understanding why and through what means conflicts manifest in the first place is an 
important part of understanding what kind of intervention to implement. Where 
conflicts involve widespread looting of households’ physical capital, for example, 
programmes built around asset transfer may not be appropriate.
 Third, a focus on the technical obscures the deeper ideological grounding of 
livelihoods interventions. There are normative dimensions to how aid agencies view 
their choices when it comes to programme selection. One could make a plausible 
case that many of the kinds of livelihoods interventions discussed here—microfinance, 
value chain development, skills training—have a strong neoliberal capitalist bent to 
them insofar as they orient beneficiaries’ livelihood strategies towards market insti-
tutions. But by constantly asking how to do things right, in quite a narrow sense, 
those concerned with post-conflict recovery essentially take these ideological ques-
tions for granted. This is perhaps a difficult one to address given that pressures to act 
relatively quickly work against taking a step back. 
3. Too much of the time, the evaluation literature privileges output 
over impact
When an evaluation is designed to assess whether something in the real world has 
got better or worse, it must be concerned with measuring outcomes and impacts. 
Certainly, this is what one would expect to see from a report claiming to show 
evidence of whether an intervention has worked. While the science of evaluation 
has increasingly been taken more seriously within international development, the 
literature on ‘impact’ is replete with cases where authors have written about outputs 
rather than impacts. That is, their concern is with whether a particular intervention 
has met its own internal goals, such as hitting a distribution target or completing 
the construction of some infrastructure within a set timeframe. While this tells us 
something about the implementation of a programme, it fails to generate any infor-
mation about whether the programme has made the end-users (or beneficiaries) better 
off or safer. This problem is related to the way in which monitoring systems tend to 
operate. As Knox Clarke and Darcy (2014) put it:
Organisational programme monitoring systems tend to concentrate on the degree to which 
inputs have been converted successfully into outputs, rather than on the way in which 
these outputs have influenced levels of need. One humanitarian organisation calculated that 
only 13% and 32% of its monitoring systems were capturing information on the actual effects 
of programmes on the humanitarian context (Knox Clarke and Darcy, 2014, pp. 32–33).
 Thus, attempts to generate information on programme performance are often 
designed to meet the bureaucratic interests of technicians and funders. These interests 
have not emerged out of a vacuum, but are a result of—and are embedded within—
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organisational reporting and accountability structures, which have tended to demand 
assessments of how well ‘inputs have been converted successfully into outputs’, to use 
the words of Knox Clarke and Darcy above. That said, there are promising moves 
towards better impact measurement within the donor community, with bilateral 
agencies such as DFID now placing a greater emphasis on the need to evaluate their 
programmes from the perspective of whether they are actually contributing to pov-
erty reduction and addressing the underlying causes of poverty (DFID, 2014).
4. Where information on impact is available, it is usually inconclusive 
Much of the time, the problem with the evidence base on programme effectiveness in 
conflict-affected places is that very little exists. But even where evidence is available, 
there can still be issues. This is partly related to context and concerns around extrapo-
lation. A systematic review might claim that a body of 25 impact studies on a par-
ticular intervention (school feeding programmes, for example) is ‘large’. In relative 
terms, this may be a valid classification—the number of impact studies of other 
interventions may be far lower. But the degree of contextual variation from one place 
to the next—in terms of cultural practices, social norms, institutions, governance 
structures, local economies—make generalising the findings of those 25 impact 
studies quite problematic. It is also possible, as we have found in our own review 
work, that an evidence base may be quite concentrated geographically. Out of 25 
studies, for example, seven may have been conducted in (a certain part of ) Kenya. 
Much of the time, therefore, an evidence base on a particular intervention is not 
representative across multiple countries and regions.
 Another issue concerning this theme is whether the findings of multiple impact 
studies (assuming multiple exist) actually tell us anything coherent and consistent. 
It is quite common for different studies to reach different conclusions about impact; 
one need only look as far as microfinance to observe the extent to which claims 
regarding effectiveness differ. This is not a problem per se; policy makers should 
not expect a single intervention to work everywhere, every time. What is prob-
lematic, however, is when we lack causal evidence that tells us why something has 
worked in this place and at this time, and why it did not in another place at another 
time. Without an understanding of the conditions that enable a livelihood interven-
tion to create the impacts it sets out to, programming will invariably suffer. This is 
why investigating failure is just as important as measuring success (Harford, 2012).
5. The underlying assumption that unemployment fosters violence and 
instability is questionable
Recent discussions within the international donor community have re-energised the 
objective of creating jobs within the world’s fragile and conflict-affected economies. 
In the past few years, two World Development Reports have championed the need 
for more jobs in countries emerging from war (World Bank, 2011; 2012), and the 
World Bank’s President, Jim Yong Kim, has argued that the ‘creation of many new 
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jobs’ can help a ‘fragile state lose its fragility’ (Kim, 2012). A particular logic underlies 
this enthusiasm: unemployed youth are normatively framed as a threat to stability 
and economic growth, and, in order to raise their opportunity cost of participating 
in political violence, must be given jobs.
 The enthusiasm expressed by the World Bank and others for jobs as a means to 
growth and stability is mirrored by the general consensus within the wider literature 
that employment creation programmes are important in fragile and conflict-affected 
situations, particularly in post-conflict environments (Beasley, 2006; Collier, 2007; 
ILO, 2010; Mendelson-Forman and Mashatt, 2007; USAID, 2009). The work of 
Collier (2007) has been influential in this respect; once peace agreements have been 
signed, ‘dangerous young men’ should be given jobs in order to raise the opportu-
nity cost of fighting and subsequently to buttress peacebuilding efforts. The logic of 
this is appealing and may appear deductively sound, but it unfortunately fails to take 
into account both the complexities of labour markets and the realities of impact.
 As discussed above, however, the policy discourse surrounding job creation in 
conflict-affected places does not square with what we actually know about the rela-
tionship between (un)employment and participation in violence. Upon first look, 
it may appear obvious that giving someone a job—filling their time with ‘produc-
tive’ economic activity—might contribute to a better livelihood for that person and 
a lower likelihood of their ‘taking up arms’ (if the conditions enable such activity). 
But any form of employment, in economies both affected and not affected by con-
flict, must be understood from a labour market perspective. Job creation is not a simple 
case of responding to unemployment by providing more jobs, nor a technical exer-
cise in matching supply with demand, but an intrinsically political and social issue 
(Kabeer, 2012). True, there are many technical aspects to programme design and 
implementation (see ILO, 2010), and there is a fair amount of existing programmatic 
evidence that provides a valuable resource to donors and implementing agencies in 
this regard (see Mallett and Slater, 2012, p. 49). But new jobs do not emerge in a 
vacuum or on a ‘blank slate’. 
 War distorts and reconfigures labour markets, introducing new dynamics that 
shape access and participation. And while conflict destroys some markets, it creates 
others, often brutally. While these markets emerge in response to wartime eco-
nomic activity and are therefore often illicit in nature, their characteristics (weak 
regulation, high risk, high return, high rent) all create a demand for labour (Cramer, 
2005). In addition, conflict can increase the fluidity of labour market dynamics, 
meaning that a job creation intervention that might make sense at one point in time 
may not at another.
 More importantly still, the evidence available suggests that the specific nature of 
employment—the terms, the limits, the dynamics of an individual’s economic activ-
ity within a particular labour market—must be part of any analysis into what a job 
means for effects on livelihoods and violence. Again relevant here is Cramer’s (2010) 
World Development Report work. Following an assessment of the literature, he con-
cludes that it is often the experience of employment—rather than unemployment—
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that drives people to participate in political violence: poor and exploitative working 
conditions, extremely low pay and a lack of formal mechanisms through which to 
express dissatisfaction all help create the conditions for violence. Evidence from Sri 
Lanka that ethnic discrimination in labour markets was a driver of conflict (Mayer 
and Salih, 2006) both reinforces this point and illustrates how labour markets tend to 
be shaped heavily by broader societal structures and dynamics. Raeymaekers (2011) 
offers further evidence on the politics of labour markets, this time from Butembo 
in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo. He finds that, although displaced youth 
are keen to pursue urban- rather than rural-based livelihoods, ‘youth access to decent 
jobs is severely blocked, not so much by their social capital [. . .] but rather by a mur-
derous market equilibrium’ (Raeymaekers, 2011, p. 27). Access to decent jobs is 
controlled by a closed group of oligopolistic gatekeepers, meaning the governance of 
local economic activity is highly exclusionary and deeply political. Labour markets, 
therefore, are as much about dynamics of power as they are about equations of supply 
and demand.
 Unfortunately, however, the lack of empirical data on the relationship between 
(un)employment and violence is symptomatic of research on labour markets in 
conflict-affected situations more broadly. As Cramer (2010, p. 2) notes, ‘the rapid 
growth of interest among development economists in the past twenty years or so in 
violent conflict and its aftermath in developing countries has made many advances 
but has devoted very little attention to labour markets’. As a result, with the exception 
of a small number of studies (Adam, 2008; Aysa-Lastra, 2011; Beall and Schutte, 2006; 
Calderón et al., 2011; Ibáñez and Moya, 2009; Walraet, 2011), we still know rela-
tively little about how conflict affects labour markets and how these changes affect 
people’s livelihoods. This can be partly accounted for by the complexity involved in 
understanding labour markets and by the challenges associated with making sense 
of their social and political characteristics.
6. The focal points of the mainstream livelihoods and conflict policy 
discourse are not always reflected in the objectives of programming
There is an apparent disconnect between, on the one hand, the overarching policy 
narrative vis-à-vis the instrumental role that jobs and livelihoods are seen to play in 
contributing to peacebuilding and, on the other, the realities of livelihood program-
ming ‘on the ground’. While post-conflict livelihood interventions are frequently 
assigned this transformative potential by key spokespersons of the international policy 
community (see, for example, Kim, 2012), it is clear that achieving specific peace-
building or social cohesion outcomes is quite often absent from the design of inter-
ventions in conflict-affected places. In short, despite what the mainstream policy 
discourse might say, many (if not most) livelihood programmes ultimately remain con-
cerned with the more orthodox material objectives of income generation and asset 
accumulation. This is more pronounced among certain interventions than others. 
For example, while some value chain programmes feature a clear design focus on 
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strengthening horizontal relationships between different social groups (Parker, 2008), 
there is very little evidence to suggest that building social cohesion comes anywhere 
near the modus operandi of the average microfinance venture.
Conclusion 
Overall, with reference to our original research question, we find that claims of the 
‘transformative potential’ of livelihood promotion interviews in conflict-affected 
situations are not backed up by strong empirical evidence. Perhaps as a result of the 
potency of conventional wisdoms and narratives of success, there does not appear to 
have been, up until recently at least, much of a culture of doing impact assessments—
something that may be partly the result of a lack of institutional space for robust cri-
tique and admissions of failure (Carr, 2013). Moreover, many evaluations appear to 
conflate outputs with impacts, the former of which are more related to the internal 
success of programme design than to outcomes for beneficiaries. This is not to say 
that good evidence on impact does not exist in the literature, but rather that it is 
counterbalanced by a far larger body of writing seemingly unconcerned with either 
impact assessment or methodological clarity. 
 More fundamentally, many studies and reports fail to include adequate information 
on their methodologies or data sources, making it difficult to appraise accurately the 
reliability of their conclusions and recommendations. Given the primary purpose of 
these studies—to provide practical policy guidance on ways to promote livelihoods—
this silence is particularly concerning. Similarly, what is also found with remarkable 
regularity are literature reviews or syntheses that offer best practice guidance and 
policy recommendations based on unclear empirical data and shaky foundations. 
(As a very basic recommendation, those responsible for writing such reports should 
include a minimum level of information on the methodologies employed and the 
empirical basis for claims.) 
 At a time when donors are particularly keen to engage in places affected by conflict 
and fragility, and to invest in activities that generate transformational change, this 
dearth of evidence is highly concerning. Indeed, it is arguably because of the absence 
of high quality impact data that largely unjustified assumptions about the effective-
ness of particular interventions often shape policy and programming choices. To 
take but one example, job creation has been championed by various segments of the 
donor community as a pathway towards stability and prosperity in conflict-affected 
countries. However, such enthusiasm appears to be based largely upon a weak under-
standing of complex and contextual labour market dynamics, a simplistic reading 
of the relationship between (un)employment and violence, and a misinterpretation 
of the evidence base. Our review, at least, suggests that the impacts of job creation 
programmes in fragile and conflict-affected situations are largely unknown. In light 
of this, as well as the various other examples included in this paper, there is a strong 
case to be made for a less zealous and more restrained handling of such interventions 
in contexts of fragility and conflict.
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Endnotes
1 The Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium (SLRC) is a six-year global research programme 
funded by the UK Department for International Development (DFID). It explores livelihoods, basic 
services and social protection in fragile and conflict-affected situations. 
2 The selected interventions included school feeding programmes, water committees, seeds-and-
tools programmes, social funds and ‘markets for the poor’ (M4P).
3 As de Klerk and Nourse (2004) explain, ‘[c]apital assets owned by grant clients who did not advance 
to loans totalled on average $16. Clients who advanced to basic loans owned $41, and those who 
went on to take advanced loans had on average $84’. 
4 For a full list, see https://www.microlinks.org/good-practice-center/value-chain-wiki/value-chain-
and-conflict-resources.
5 See http://www.m4phub.org/debates/ for more information.
6 A recent report defines reintegration as ‘the process by which ex-combatants and other benefi-
ciaries acquire civilian status and (hopefully) gain sustainable livelihoods and income’ (UNDP, 
2008, p. 66).
7 See http://bigpushforward.net/about.
8 The rise of systematic reviews in international development is symptomatic of this. However, 
systematic reviews are far from objective and apolitical; choices about how to assess the quality 
of evidence have profound implications for a review’s findings (see Hagen-Zanker et al., 2012; 
Mallett et al., 2012).
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